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28 January 1982

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EL SALVADOR: Aircraft Destroyed	
//The sabotage of military aircraguerrilla infiltrators or sympathizers. Force maintenance crewscritically we ment's already limited capacity to air troops, react to guerrilla thrusts, are age to ground troops. Six of 14 UH reportedly have been destroyed or seven of the remaining eight are grounded as El Salvador's 15 other helicopters are observation craft, unsuitable for air Five of 11 Ouragan aircraft are total inating one-third of the government's fighters. Three of eight all-purpose	s serving on Air eakens the govern- rlift supplies and nd provide air covlH helicopters erely damaged; most waiting repairs. e primarily light lifting troops. ly destroyed, elim- fleet of aging jet
planes also have been damaged or destricted	royed.//
Comment: The guerrillas have been spread but localized campaigns aimed a electoral process, seizing internations shaking the government's confidence. The Air Force, at least temporarily, now undertake more ambitious offensive general offensive is unlikely to develover, given the apparent absence of guerring and their continuing material shapes.	at disrupting the nal headlines, and Having crippled the insurgents may e operations. Any lop momentum, how- uerrilla prepara-

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NICARAGUA: Campaign of Repression	
The Sandinistas have declared the easter a restricted military zone in an effort to cor ures they are taking to suppress antiregime ac	iceal the extreme meas-
//The government has begun a camp against Indians in the area.	25)
the Army has attacked In- killing and arresting many, and is now villages.//	
//Entire communities apparently have away from the Nicaraguan-Honduran bord villages burned. This has caused many to flee to Honduras. Travel to the arrestricted and news reporting is black	er and the vacated of the Indians ea is being tightly ed out.//
Comment: //These actions indicate concern over raids by guerrilla forces number of government casualties. Over this repression could swell the ranks Sandinista forces operating from Hondu aggravate the separatist sentiment and Indians who remain. It also could dam current effort to gain a seat on the Union Rights.//	and the increased the longer term, of the anti- ras as well as hostility of the age Nicaragua's

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EC: Actions on Poland	
//EC members hope that their decision to take a measures against Warsaw and Moscow will lessen US and public pressure to adopt tougher restrictions.//	
//With the exception of the Greek repres EC Foreign Ministers on Monday approved the E sion's cancellation last week of subsidized f	EC Commis- Food sales
to the Polish Government. Eight of the ministo propose that the OECD slightly increase minterest rates charged the USSR under the expressions.//	inimum 🕠
//France deferred approval of the action Finance Ministry officials questioned whether fell under the competence of the EC. Paris is however, as favoring the rate hike.//	the matter
//The Foreign Ministers also considered imports of Soviet luxury items and told the Cinvestigate future economic measures the EC coment. They left open the possibility of askin mission to examine the importance and effective recent US actions against Poland and the USSI	Commission to could imple- ing the Com- iveness of
//In addition, the ministers agreed that CSCE participants should assail Polish and So when the meeting reopens in Madrid on 9 Februarejected, however, the US position that the machine should adjourn immediately after the debate of	oviet policy uary. They meeting
Comment: //The EC remains anxious to average possible economic and political consequences stringent restrictions. The EC members believes measures implemented by the US so far have resacrifice and have been primarily symbolic.//	of more eve that the equired little
//EC members want to use the CSCE meeting size Western determination to end martial law and to camouflage their reluctance to go beyone they oppose US efforts to recess the session after it resumes on grounds that continuing the state of the session are stated as the session ar	w in Poland . ond rhetoric. shortly the talks
will allow the West to keep pressure on Mosco	continued
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//Although EC members do not believe progress toward a post-Madrid security conference is possible now, they do not want to take responsibility for killing the idea. Most believe that CSCE security concerns are more important than human rights issues Poland notwithstanding.//

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SYRIA-JORDAN: Increased Tension		
The intensified propaganda attacks that exchanging reflect their continuing disagreem issues.		25 X
Jordan has accused Syria of master bombing in Amman on 11 January. Syria charging that the Jordanians allowed across the Syrian-Jordanian border and Army patrol on 21 January.	a has countered by an armed band to	25 X
		25X
Jordan also is at odds with Syria military role in Lebanon, its support and its opposition to the Fahd peace page 1	of Iran in the war,	25 X
Syria has long charged that Jorda financial and material support to Musiterrorists operating in Syria. In November 1 to 1 to 2 to 2 to 2 to 2 to 2 to 2 to	lim Brotherhood vember 1980, Syria n an attempt to in- ummit in Amman. rdan has formed an udi Arabia to iso-	
process.	are peace	25X

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IRELAND: Government Crisis		
//The unexpected defeat of Pri government on the budget vote yester within the next month.//	ime Minister Fitzgerald's minority rday will lead to new elections	25X1
<pre>//The defeat was brought several independents who switc issue were proposed tax increa country's \$2 billion deficit./</pre>	ses aimed at reducing the	, 25X1
//The government's previous last summer, has not held down and recent polls point to subsits economic policies. The pofine Gael-Labor coalition sligtion Fianna Fail.//	stantial disenchantment with olls also show the ruling	25X1
Comment: //The government defeat to get a majority in nealmost certainly will claim that to his policy and will hope the better before new austerity mewill also try to take advantage problems within the Fianna Fainot offered its own economic personal section.	ew elections. Fitzgerald nat there is no alternative nat his prospects will be easures take effect. He ge of recent internal l by charging that it has	25X1
//Northern Ireland is unl paign issue, although Fitzgera his proposals for constitution Republic more attractive to Ul election also will be the firstactic of the Provisional Sinn of the Provisional Irish Repubparliamentary elections.//	hal changes to make the ster Protestants. The st major test for the new n Feinthe political arm	25X1
paign issue, although Fitzgera his proposals for constitution Republic more attractive to Ul election also will be the firs tactic of the Provisional Sinn of the Provisional Irish Repub	ald's opponents will attack hal changes to make the lster Protestants. The st major test for the new h Feinthe political arm	

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SUDAN: Nimeiri Buys Some Time	
Khartoum remains calm, and there is that the recently purged senior Army of other elements are preparing to move as Nimeiri. of First Vice President Khalil has at 1 prived the opposition of a rallying point.	ficers or any ainst President Nimeiri's removal east <u>for now d</u> e-
Comment: Nimeiri's trip to Aswan ing with Egyptian President Mubarak yes his confidence that his hold on power i actions this week, however, have intenstion.	terday reflects s secure. His
USSR: Speedup of US Grain Deliveries	
//The USSR has asked US grain firm shipments of about 2 million tons of US during the fourth quarter of 1981 and o duled for delivery through March. The be shipped by late February or early Ma Moscow's fear of another g prompted the request.//	grain bought riginally sche- grain is now to rch.
Comment: //The accelerated delive the current congestion at Soviet grain probably will not return to the US mark after all of the 12.5 million tons of U far has been delivered. At that time, to insist on immediate delivery of any grain they buy. They may try to purchalion or 6 million tons by 30 June, the ing year.//	ports. The USSR et until March, S grain bought so they are likely additional US se another 5 mil-

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BRAZIL-CUBA: Trade Prospects

A private Brazilian commercial delegation visited Cuba recently to talk to senior Cuban trade officials about sales opportunities for a wide range of Brazilian products. President Castro expressed a desire to reestablish economic ties, which were severed in 1964, and offered preferential treatment for Brazilian exports. Brazilian official spokesmen were aware of the trip, but denied authorizing the discussions. Diplomatic relations remain suspended and Brazil continues to prohibit direct exports to Cuba.

Comment: Brazil's economic pragmatism, which has already led to increased trade with the Soviets and East Europeans, probably is the primary motivation behind the recent contacts. Trial sales are likely--perhaps through a third country such as Panama--to reopen commercial ties without breaking Brazilian law. Weak sugar prices, however, will curb Cuba's ability to pay for imports. The Brazilian prohibition against direct trade precludes use of government commercial insurance and export financing facilities. The limited opportunity for trade over the near term probably will reinforce the strong opposition in Brazil to resuming trade or diplomatic relations with Cuba.

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COLOMBIA-ISRAEL: Interest in Kfir Airc	raft
//The Colombian Air Force is consileast eight Kfir fighter aircraft from age deal that would include spare parts It still hopes, however, to receive mor from US or French manufacturers.//	Israel in a pack- and training.
Comment: //The purchase of KFIRs cant departure from the government's probuying equipment used in counterinsurge and of staying within the military budge MIG aircraft going to Nicaragua and the US F-16 fighters to Venezuela, however, Colombian security concerns. Although are engaged in a border dispute over oi Gulf of Venezuela, Colombian leaders are now about possible threats from Nicarage Castro regime has supplied arms to left Colombia, and relations with Nicaragua over Bogota's support for El Salvador's	riority of mainly ency operations set. Reports of proposed sale of have heightened Bogota and Caracas I rights in the emore concerned and Cuba. The cist guerrillas in have been strained

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LIBERIA: Student Protests		
Security forces yesterday dispersed student protestors, the first such incide of State Doe took power in 1980. The deapparently had planned to march to the Exprotesting the regime's arrest and trial six leftist student leaders accused of expressions the ban on politics.	dent since He emonstrators, US Embassy, v l last week o	ead who were of
Comment: Doe is determined that strespect the ban, and he is unlikely to be tional demonstrations or an overreaction rity forces could further weaken Doe's pespecially if slum dwellers were to become	pack down. And to them by position, how	Addi- secu- vever,

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS		
JAPAN: Next Step in Defense Plannin	g	0.5
mt d-f mt marine manage and time	1	25
The defense planning process getting a have an important influence on Japan's miliend of the decade. There are signs that part how to proceed.	tary capabilities by the	25
//Now that the cabinet has approbudget for this year, the government attention to establishing goals for The relatively large increase for FY marily from the leadership's concern reaction if Tokyo failed to honor thister Suzuki made last May to Preside would make greater efforts in defense	is turning its the FY 1983-87 period. 1982 resulted pri- about an adverse US e pledge Prime Min- ent Reagan that Japan	25
//The Japanese still see their a deterrent against Soviet aggression placating the US. Tokyo's reading of Washington's interest thus will be a mulating the five-year plan.//	n than as a means of f the intensity of	25
The Midterm Operations Estimate		
The estimate will specify the k military equipment to be acquired over years. This month the three service submit their individual plans to the which will present a combined propose National Defense Council in March. be the most ambitious version of the quent negotiations with other minist lower equipment targets and spending	er the next five s are scheduled to Defense Agency, al to the cabinet's This probably will plan because subse- ries are likely to	25
Suzuki and other party leaders the final version in July. The estineffect until the next defense planning	mate will remain in	2
	continued	
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The Political Climate	
Although the Prime Minister's fiscal austerity program is coming under fire, he is still pursuing it and would prefer that the estimate entail only a moderate increase in defense spending. He also has suggested to the Defense Agency that defense expenditures should be kept under 1 percent of GNP.	، 25X
The l percent ceiling was established in 1976 to head off protests from opposition parties against the government's allegedly "limitless" rearmament program and has since become an important political restraint on defense spending. Even a moderate acceleration in defense spending increases probably would exceed the ceiling by 1986.	25X
//Although it is still politically risky for a Japa- nese politician to advocate a dramatic increase in the defense effort, there are a few signs that public oppo- sition to an incremental military buildup is beginning to erode. Despite heavy press criticism of the defense budget for this year, ruling Liberal Democrats at their annual convention last week passed a resolution that declared that a defense budget limited to 1 percent of GNP was "undeniably inadequate."//	25X
//This contradiction of Suzuki's personal preference indicates that party pressure was instrumental in determining defense spending for 1982 and that Suzuki is a follower rather than a leader on the issue in his own party. The resolution also may presage a significant debate among party leaders over the pace of defense spending. Even the cautious Suzuki recently noted that Japan may not be able to adhere to the 1-percent ceiling much beyond 1987.//	25X
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